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I. INTRODUCTION
Beware the next time you open the door of your home and sign for a
package; the person before you, despite her uniform and van adorned with
the familiar “FedEx” logo, is as much an employee of the shipping
conglomerate as you are. At least, that is the opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.1
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act2 (“Act” or
“NLRA”) to combat economic pressures in the American workplace and to
allow American workers to accrue the benefits inherent in collective
bargaining.3 Since 1947, the jurisdictional question of whether workers
receive federal protection from the National Labor Relations Board
(“Board” or “NLRB”) for their concerted and union activity has turned, in
part, on whether workers are “employees” under section 2(3) of the
NLRA.4 In FedEx Ground & Home Delivery v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit
withheld the right to join a union and bargain collectively, both guaranteed
1. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 503-04 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(holding that FedEx delivery drivers are “independent contractors” and not
“employees” because of their personal, substantial, entrepreneurial opportunity for gain
and loss).
2. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-53, 157, 159-61, 163, 165-67 (2006)).
3. See Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights:
The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 58 (2007) (espousing the
NLRA as a free-market solution to market failures that occur in the absence of
collectivized bargaining).
4. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2006)) (stating that
“independent contractors” and “supervisors” are exempt from NLRB’s jurisdiction).
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by section 7 of the NLRA, from persons who deliver packages for FedEx
Home Delivery in Wilmington, Massachusetts.5 The D.C. Circuit’s
interpretation of the Act’s definition of “employee” led to the conclusion
that the delivery drivers were “independent contractors.” As such, the
drivers were barred from the Act’s protections, which would have provided
for NLRB enforcement of the collective bargaining process between the
drivers’ elected union and FedEx.6 In September 2009, the D.C. Circuit
denied the NLRB’s petition for rehearing that urged the court to correct its
actions in FedEx and avoid a split among the circuit courts.7
This Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit erroneously shifted the
determination of employee status under the NLRA away from the common
law of agency by making a putative employee’s “significant entrepreneurial
opportunity” dispositive, contrary to clear congressional intent and
Supreme Court precedent.8 Part II of this Comment reviews the
development of the common law right-to-control test for determining an
employee’s status under the Act.9 Part II also examines the development of
the right-to-control test in the D.C. Circuit and other federal courts of
appeal, and explores the underlying facts and the court’s opinion in
FedEx.10 Part III demonstrates how the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, which
resulted in a split in authority among the circuit courts, creates conflict with
Supreme Court precedent.11 Part IV argues that the D.C. Circuit’s ruling
will have deleterious effects on the authority of the NLRB to effectuate the
Act and that it has likely shut the door to union representation for American
5. See 563 F.3d at 497 (couching the decision that delivery drivers fall under the
statutory exemption of “independent contractors” by emphasizing the drivers’
“significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss” within the context of their
relationship with FedEx, over common law agency factors); see also Corp. Express
Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (shifting the emphasis
from the traditional common law right-to-control test factors to entrepreneurial
opportunity as a more accurate reflection of employment status under the NLRA).
6. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 504 (vacating the NLRB’s cease-anddesist order against FedEx for failing to engage in collective bargaining with the union
in violation of the NLRA).
7. See Posting of Jeffrey M. Hirsch to Workplace Prof Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2009/week37/index.html (Sept. 10,
2009) (noting that the court had created a test “that relied almost exclusively on the
workers’ entrepreneurial opportunity rather than the typical Darden factors” to
determine their agency status).
8. See Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc on Behalf of
the National Labor Relations Board at 1, FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB (D.C. Cir.
June 4, 2009) (No. 07-1391) [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing] (arguing that the D.C.
Circuit in FedEx did not follow D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court precedent).
9. See infra Part II.A-D (detailing the treatment of statutory “employees” under
the Act by the Supreme Court after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments).
10. See infra Part II.E-F (chronicling the jurisprudence regarding employee status
under the NLRA).
11. See infra Part III (criticizing the D.C. Circuit’s attempts to ignore congressional
intent by over-emphasizing a factor not present in the common law of agency).
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workers who need it the most.12 Finally, Part V concludes that the
Supreme Court should once again clarify the test used to determine whether
someone is an employee for purposes of the NLRA and resolve the circuit
split.13
II. BACKGROUND
A. The National Labor Relations Act
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act.14 One
principal goal of the NLRA, as outlined in section 7 of the Act, is to give
employees the right to be free from discrimination and coercion in
employment on the basis of their concerted and union activity.15 Though
the rights inured to employees under section 7 are often interpreted
broadly, their most prevalent application, as a practical matter, is to
preserve and protect the collective bargaining process that allows
employees, through their elected union representatives, to have sufficient
bargaining power with their employers to affect the terms and conditions of
their employment.16
The rights guaranteed by section 7 of the Act have an important
limitation: only “employees” within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act
are protected.17 In 1944, the Supreme Court first defined the test to
determine if someone was an employee under the NLRA.18 In NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, the Court decided that using common law principles
to identify employees for purposes of the NLRA would prove cumbersome
and yield results that were discordant with the affirmative, protective intent
embodied in the Act.19 The Court instead applied a test that hinged on the
12. See infra Part IV (explaining that since the D.C. Circuit has jurisdiction to
review any decision of the NLRB in representation determinations, a narrower view of
the Section 2(3) definition of “employee” will have an almost immediate negative
effect on workers’ ability to obtain union representation).
13. See infra Part V (urging the NLRB to seek certiorari to rectify the circuit split
created by FedEx).
14. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No.198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2006)) (granting employees federal protection for
their union activities).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (stating that employers who interfere with section 7
rights commit unfair labor practices).
16. See § 158(a)(5) (making a refusal to bargain with an elected union
representative an unfair labor practice subject to remedy by the NLRB).
17. See § 152 (withholding section 7 rights from supervisors, agricultural workers,
and independent contractors).
18. See NLRB v. Hearst Pub., 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944) (holding that Congress
intended to cover a wider range of employees for NLRA purposes than the traditional
master-servant relationship would allow).
19. See id. at 122-23 (stating that leaving the jurisdictional question of “employee”
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economic realities of the work relationship to better fulfill the intention of
Congress in favor of granting American workers the right to unionize.20
Under the economic realities test, the Court upheld the finding that the
newsboys at issue in Hearst Publications were employees under the NLRA
because the newsboys provided an integral part of the employer’s business:
the distribution of newspapers.21 The Court did so even though the
employer had little control over the work performance of the newsboys,
reasoning that the relationship between their jobs and the employer’s core
business was more important than the common law agency principles that
bound the two together.22
B. The Taft-Hartley Amendments
Three years after Hearst Publications, Congress responded to the
Supreme Court’s broad definition of “employees” under the Act by
expressly excluding “independent contractors” from the NLRB’s
jurisdiction.23 Through the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA,
Congress went a step further than merely spelling out statutory exclusions
to the definition of “employee” in section 2(3) of the Act; it expressly
overruled the Supreme Court’s economic realities test in favor of the
common law principles of agency.24 Congress’s preference for the
principles of agency law is also manifest in section 2(13) of the NLRA,
which holds employers liable for the unfair labor practices committed by
their agents.25 Meanwhile, the Court began to deviate from the principles it
laid out in Hearst Publications by applying the economic realities test as
only one factor within the common law test for agency (the “right-tocontrol test”).26
status under the Act to the common law test for master-servant would yield results
contrary to Congress’s intent of broad labor reform).
20. See id. at 127–28 (finding that employee status should turn on the
characteristics of a given industry in light of the vast differences between the industries
subject to the NLRA).
21. See id. at 131-32 (discussing the NLRB’s rationale for including the newsboys
as consistent with the purpose of the NLRA).
22. Id. at 131.
23. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
Stat. 137 (1947); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006) (excluding supervisors from the
Act).
24. See 80 CONG. REC. S6136 (daily ed. June 5, 1947) (statement of Sen. Taft)
(reading into the record that “the general principles of the law of agency” are intended
to determine section 2(3) “employees” under the amendments to the NLRA).
25. See § 152(13) (stating that principles of authorization or ratification shall not be
controlling when determining if someone is acting as an agent of another, so as to make
the direct actor responsible for committing unfair labor practices on behalf of her
employer).
26. See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 719 (1947) (holding that the traditional
right-to-control test must be examined in conjunction with the economic realities of the
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C. The Common Law Right-to-Control Test
The right-to-control test originated in England during the mid-nineteenth
century before taking root in the United States in 1857.27 It inquires
whether the person in question was under the control of another to such a
sufficient degree to allow the latter to be held accountable for the torts of
the former.28 The right-to-control test was used as a means of assigning
tort liability to agents outside the traditional master-servant dichotomy
during the Industrial Revolution through the doctrine of respondeat
superior.29 The test adopts the notion that the relationship between master
and servant is constrained by the amount of control exerted on the servant
by the master.30
American courts have compiled a non-exhaustive list of factors to
determine whether a master-servant relationship exists.31 These factors are:
(1) the agreed upon control that the employer may exercise over the
putative employee in the details of the work to be performed;
(2) whether the putative employee is engaged in a distinct business or
occupation;
(3) the type of occupation and whether it is usually performed under the
direction of an employer or by a non-supervised specialist;
(4) the degree of skill necessary to perform the given tasks;
(5) whether the employer supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the
workplace;
(6) the temporal duration of the employment relationship between the
parties;
(7) whether payment is rendered by time worked or by task performed;
(8) whether the work performed is part of the regular business of the
employer;
(9) whether the parties believe that an employer-employee relationship
exists between them; and
(10) whether the putative employee does business with other
situation).
27. See Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469, 489-90 (1857) (applying English common
law, which holds a master vicariously liable for the torts of his servant under the theory
of respondeat superior).
28. See id. at 493 (holding that actual employer control over an employee is what
binds the employer in liability for actions undertaken within the scope of employment).
29. See John Bruntz, The Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy: A Rose Is
Not Always a Rose, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 337, 339-41 (1991) (detailing the
evolution of the law to cope with new torts in the evolving industrial context of the
second half of the nineteenth century).
30. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958) (noting that the
control of a master differentiates a servant from an independent contractor);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (abandoning the master/servant
language in favor of principal and agent).
31. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52
(1989).
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employers.32

The ad hoc, fact-specific nature of the test ensures that no one factor is
dispositive.33
When all the factors relevant to the factual context of a specific work
relationship between an employer and a putative employee are considered,
the right-to-control test determines who controls the manner and means of
work performance; if the employer retains control, then the person in
question is an employee.34 In recognition of the importance of the
multifactor right-to-control analysis as a matter of agency law, the Supreme
Court in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden expressly held that
where Congress is silent on the definition of the term “employee” in federal
labor and employment legislation, then the multifactor right-to-control test
was the test Congress intended to be used.35
D. The Right-to-Control Test and Section 2(3) of the Act
After the Taft-Hartley Amendments, the Supreme Court first revisited
the definition of “employee” under Section 2(3) of the Act in NLRB v.
United Insurance Co. of America.36 The Court affirmed the congressional
intent that the right-to-control test be used to determine who is covered
under the Act.37 Additionally, the Court noted that when faced with two
conflicting views, a circuit court should not displace the NLRB’s
determination of an individual’s eligibility under the NLRA, even if the
court would have reached a different opinion if the issue were presented de
novo.38 In NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, the Court reiterated its
support for a broad interpretation of section 2(3)’s definition of “employee”
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1957) (listing the factors
considered in determining whether one acting on behalf of another is a servant or
independent contractor); FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (quoting the Second Restatement of Agency as the source for the non-exhaustive,
ten-factor test used to make employee determinations under the NLRA).
33. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968) (holding that a
proper application of the right-to-control test assesses all of the incidents of the work
relationship and gives no one factor decisive weight).
34. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §1.01.
35. See 503 U.S. 318, 323-25 (1992) (adopting the factors outlined at Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 220 as consistent with the agency principles Congress sought to
apply for purposes of ERISA and other federal statutes).
36. See 390 U.S. at 260 (holding that the NLRB’s determination that insurance
agents were “employees” was appropriate where the NLRB established all the facts and
reviewed them in light of the common law principles of agency).
37. See id. at 256 (declaring that the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments
showed Congress’s disapproval of the Court’s approach in Hearst Publications and its
preference for the fact-specific common law test for “employee” under general
principles of agency).
38. See id. at 260 (instructing deference to the NLRB’s decision-making on
contentious issues such as “employee” coverage under the NLRA).
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as consistent with the congressional intent of the NLRA.39 The NLRB has
consistently applied the common law right-to-control test for agency and
conceded that it is beyond the Board’s power to deviate from that test in
determining whether someone is covered by the Act.40 In addition to the
common law factors, the Board often includes one more factor when
examining that factual context of the employment relationship in applying
of the right-to-control test: whether the putative employee has an
opportunity for entrepreneurial gain or loss.41 This factor has been met
with uniform approval by all of the circuit courts when reviewing the
Board’s determination of an individual’s status under section 2(3) of the
NLRA.42
E. Employees Under the NLRA in the Circuit Courts
1. The D.C. Circuit
In determining whether an individual is an employee under the NLRA,
the D.C. Circuit has traditionally applied the right-to-control test’s factual
analysis as to who controls the manner and means of work performance in
determining whether someone is an employee under the NLRA following
the Supreme Court’s decision in United Insurance.43 In addition to the
traditional common law factors, the D.C. Circuit’s cases have also
discussed whether entrepreneurial opportunities are available to the
putative employees in its analysis of the factual context underlying the
work relationship.44 At first blush, the following cab and truck driver cases
seem to yield perverse and often baffling results in light of the inclusion of
the entrepreneurial opportunities factor.
39. See 516 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1995) (approving the NLRB’s broad definition of
employee when it makes the determination utilizing law of agency principles).
40. See Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. 884, 890-91 (1998)
(finding that the Supreme Court-approved right-to-control test, steeped in the common
law of agency, is the only test the NLRB may apply when examining the reach of
section 2(3)).
41. See, e.g., St. Joseph News-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. 474, 479 (2005) (delineating
that the amount of control which the employer retains over entrepreneurial
opportunities aids the right-to-control test analysis).
42. See, e.g., C.C. Eastern v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that
a driver’s retention of significant entrepreneurial opportunities tends to support a
finding of independent contractor status).
43. See, e.g., Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm., Seafarers Int’l Union of
N. Am. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 863, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (explaining that all of the
circumstances of the work relationship, including the manner and means of work
performance, must be weighed when determining employee status under the right-tocontrol test).
44. See Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 381 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (noting that strong entrepreneurial freedom should be considered when applying
the right-to-control test).
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a. Local 777 to C.C. Eastern
In Local 777, Democratic Union Organizing Committee, Seafarers
International Union of North America v. NLRB (“Local 777”), the D.C.
Circuit first tackled the difficult distinction between independent
contractors and employees arising in the context of taxicab, delivery, and
freight drivers.45 The Local 777 court affirmed the Board’s finding that the
taxicab drivers at issue were independent contractors because the business
owner retained little control over the manner and means of performance of
work.46 The court emphasized that the right-to-control test is the
appropriate test for examining the factual context underlying an NLRB
representational determination.47 In applying the non-exhaustive list of
common law factors, the court found that the drivers’ putative employer
retained virtually no day-to-day control over the drivers.48
In City Cab Co. of Orlando v. NLRB (“Orlando”), however, the D.C.
Circuit affirmed the NLRB’s holding that the taxicab drivers at issue were
employees under the NLRA and distinguished Local 777.49 In Orlando,
the employer required detailed trip sheets documenting all the fares a driver
picked up; significantly regulated the hours that drivers could work;
substantially controlled passenger selection via contract with the municipal
airport; inured no entrepreneurial opportunities to their drivers to
incentivize making larger profits; and prescribed an extensive dress code
for its drivers.50 The court concluded that these five factors tipped the
balance in favor of employee status because it indicated that the employer
had sufficient control over the manner and means of work performance to
render the drivers “employees” as a matter of the law of agency.51
Three years later, in Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, the D.C.
Circuit denied enforcement of an unfair labor practice remedy on the
grounds that the NLRB incorrectly found that the drivers at issue were
employees.52 The court noted that although the NLRB justified its finding
45. See 603 F.2d at 869-70 (observing that the NLRB’s own ad hoc determination
of employee status for drivers has produced inconsistent judgments).
46. See id. at 875 (finding that the drivers at issue were only constrained by
municipal regulations, not employer limitations).
47. See id. at 874 (describing that when an employer retains control over the result
of the work and the details of carrying it out, the individual at issue will be an
employee).
48. See id. (adopting the section 220(2)’s list of non-exhaustive factors as the
relevant factors for distinguishing between employees and independent contractors).
49. See 628 F.2d 261, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that the NLRB had effectively
weighed all the incidents of the work relationship pursuant to United Insurance).
50. See id. at 264-65 (observing that the five factors present in Orlando were the
precise factors missing in Local 777).
51. Id. at 265.
52. See 721 F.2d 366, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (criticizing the NLRB’s finding as not
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of employee status by relying on several of the factors present in Orlando,
it had neglected to consider that the drivers were free to conduct ninety-five
percent of their business absent any significant control from Yellow Taxi.53
The court specifically noted that contractual controls were insignificant in
the face of the substantial absence of day-to-day control over the drivers.54
The court further chastised the NLRB’s determination as being contrary to
law under the right-to-control test.55
In North American Van Lines v. NLRB (“NAVL”), the D.C. Circuit once
again overturned the Board’s finding that drivers were employees for
purposes of the NLRA.56 The NAVL court, in applying the right-to-control
test, found that the freight drivers retained control over the manner and
means of performance.57 The court focused its inquiry on three specific
facts which were dispositive in this particular case: the drivers’ near
absolute control over their performance and appearance while driving, the
equity interest that the drivers held in the vehicles they leased or owned,
and the entrepreneurial opportunities, which had previously been referred
to as “good will,” afforded to the drivers who controlled when and how
often they would work.58
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit’s critical view of the NLRB in both NAVL
and Yellow Taxi, the D.C. Circuit commended the NLRB for its application
of the right-to-control test in Construction Employees Union, Local No.
221 v. NLRB (“Local 221”).59 There, the court affirmed the Board’s
finding that truck drivers were independent contractors because, in
applying the right-to-control test’s fact-driven analysis, the Board held that
no one factor was decisive and instead focused on all the circumstances of
the employment relationship.60 The Local 221 court noted that the drivers’
ability to choose the days and hours they worked and their right even to
abandon jobs they had commenced, without fear of discipline, strongly
supported by evidence).
53. See id. at 381 (noting that the NLRB’s statement that the drivers did not own
their vehicles did not demonstrate that the drivers were under employer-control).
54. See id. at 378 (noting that for each instance of control, under the factors
deemed relevant in Orlando, the NLRB had no support in the record).
55. See id. at 381-82 (admonishing the NLRB for not following binding precedent
in the D.C. Circuit).
56. 869 F.2d 596, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
57. Id. at 599-600.
58. See id. at 600 (observing that the NLRB was confusing the employer’s control
over the ends achieved with the manner and means to achieve them).
59. See 899 F.2d 1238, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (applauding the NLRB’s review of
all of the circumstances of the employment relationship as being consistent with
Supreme Court precedent).
60. See id. (noting that a proper inquiry under the right-to-control test will look
beyond the actual supervision that an employer exerts if the control is necessary under
the circumstances).
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supported the Board’s conclusion that the drivers were statutorily exempt
from the NLRA.61
In 1995, the D.C. Circuit overturned the NLRB’s decision that truck
drivers were statutory employees in C.C. Eastern v. NLRB.62 The C.C.
Eastern court found that the Board’s application of the right-to-control test
was inherently flawed because it failed to significantly weigh all of the
factors underlying the relationship between the company and its workers.63
The court reversed the NLRB’s determination because the company did not
retain control over the hours drivers worked, mandate dress or appearance
requirements, or impose a conventional disciplinary system on its drivers.64
Common to all of the D.C. Circuit decisions up to this point was a reliance
on the multifactor, common law, right-to-control test, with entrepreneurial
opportunity being but one of the many factors considered in determining an
individual’s status for the purpose of the NLRA.65
b. Corporate Express
In Corporate Express Delivery Systems v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit
abruptly took a new direction in determining whether drivers who delivered
packages and owned their own vehicles were employees for purposes of the
NLRA.66 There, the court affirmed an NLRB decision that Corporate
Express violated the NLRA by firing, threatening, and monitoring
employees who were engaged in organizing a union among its owneroperator drivers, but did so on grounds other than the NLRB’s application
of the right-to-control test.67 Under the analysis mandated by the right-tocontrol test, the Board found that the owner-operators were employees
because drivers could not deviate from their employer’s set delivery route
or schedule, all drivers were required to wear pagers so they could be
61. See id. at 1242-43 (finding support in the record for the proposition that the
drivers worked at their whim).
62. See 60 F.3d 855, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (relying on the employer’s minimal
supervision of the manner and means of performance in pronouncing the drivers
independent contractors).
63. See id. at 860 (pointing out the NLRB’s apparent confusion of company efforts
to monitor and improve results of employee performance as equivalent to employer
control over the manner and means of performance).
64. See id. at 858 (noting that these facts point to independent contractor status
under the right-to-control test).
65. Cf. FedEx Home Delivery v. NRLB, 563 F.3d 492, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(Garland, J., dissenting) (noting that the only case in any circuit court that emphasizes
entrepreneurial opportunity over the right-to-control test is Corporate Express).
66. See 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (declining to analyze the factual
underpinnings of the work relationship under the right-to-control test’s manner and
means inquiry).
67. See id. at 781 (affirming the NLRB’s holding that the firing of the drivers at
issue was in retaliation for their union activities).
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reached at all times for scheduling changes, and a dress code was imposed
on all drivers.68
Yet in affirming the NLRB’s decision, the D.C. Circuit declined to base
its analysis on the traditional inquiry into who controls the manner and
means of work performance.69 Instead, the D.C. Circuit, while supporting
the NLRB’s decision, shifted its emphasis to hinge upon whether the
putative independent contractors had significant entrepreneurial
opportunity for gain or loss.70 Curiously, the D.C. Circuit’s claim that the
shift in emphasis to entrepreneurial opportunity came at the NLRB’s
suggestion is not reflected in either the NLRB’s reported decision or the
NLRB’s brief before the D.C. Circuit.71
2. Section 2(3) in the Other Circuits
Like the D.C. Circuit until its decision in Corporate Express, all of the
other federal appellate courts applied the multi-factor common law right-tocontrol test analysis when determining employee status for purposes of the
NLRA.72 Despite citing to the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Corporate
Express, both the Sixth and the Ninth Circuits still went on to hold that the
right-to-control test’s analysis of who controls the manner and means of
work performance is the appropriate test for determining whether an
individual is an employee and therefore covered by the protections of the
NLRA for his union activity.73
68. See id. at 780 (assessing that the substantial evidence of control could be used
to support the NLRB’s finding under the right-to-control test).
69. But see id. (noting that the NLRB’s analysis of the factual context under the
right-to-control test in Corporate Express was well within the discretion afforded the
NLRB in making its choice between two fairly conflicting views on employee status).
70. See id. (holding that because the drivers had virtually all entrepreneurial
opportunities withheld from them, they were employees).
71. Compare id. (declaring that the Board urged the shift in focus away from
control over the manner and means of performance to entrepreneurial opportunity),
with Corporate Express Delivery Sys., 332 N.L.R.B. 1522 (2000) (affirming the
Administrative Law Judge’s determination that the employees demonstrated all the
indicia of employee status under the right-to-control test, including entrepreneurial
opportunity), and Brief of Respondent at 39, Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v.
NLRB, No. 01-1058 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 16, 2001) (urging the D.C. Circuit to reexamine
its own precedent and “give appropriate weight to all of the factors in the common-law
agency test” in light of Supreme Court precedent affirming the right-to-control test).
72. See, e.g., Hilton Int’l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding
that band members were independent contractors under the right-to-control test);
Collegiate Basketball Officials Ass’n v. NLRB, 836 F.2d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 1987)
(holding that basketball referees were independent contractors because they retain
control over the manner and means of their performance); NLRB v. O’Hare-Midway
Limousine Serv., 924 F.2d 692, 694-95 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding ample support in the
evidence to conclude that a limousine driver was a statutory employee under the rightto-control test).
73. See Time Auto Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the right-to-control test’s inquiry into all the circumstances of the work
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In 2004, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment of the NLRB that longhaul delivery drivers were statutory employees in Time Auto
Transportation, Inc. v. NLRB.74 The Sixth Circuit held, under its
application of the right-to-control test, that the NLRB had correctly
identified the drivers as employees under the right-to-control test.75 Even
though the drivers had substantial investments in their lease agreements
with Time Auto and were individually incorporated, the court pointed out
that Time Auto could terminate its drivers for refusing or failing to make
assigned deliveries.76
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit, in NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., upheld the
NLRB’s ruling that taxicab drivers constituted employees under the NLRA
and that their employer, Friendly Cab, committed unfair labor practices by
refusing to bargain with their elected union representative.77 The court
ruled that Friendly’s drivers were employees because the drivers were
unable to develop independent business relationships, were subject to a
strict disciplinary regime aimed at controlling their performance on a dayto-day basis, and were forced to abide by a mandatory, extensive dress
code.78 Additionally, Friendly required its drivers to carry advertisements
on their cabs that would sometimes result in the loss of a potential fare; in
light of this fact, the Ninth Circuit noted that the drivers had limited
entrepreneurial opportunities.79 By the time that FedEx Home Delivery
was argued in the D.C. Circuit in 2009, it was apparent that all of the other
federal appellate courts were still faithfully applying the right-to-control
test.

relationship is used for the employee status determination under the NLRA); see also
NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (expressing no
doubt that the right-to-control test’s totality of the circumstances inquiry is the correct
standard for purposes of section 2(3)).
74. See Time Auto Transp., 377 F.3d at 500 (upholding the NLRB’s determination
that Time Auto had violated the NLRA by firing two drivers engaged in union
organizing activities).
75. See id. at 499 (emphasizing that no one factor tips the balance under the rightto-control test and that all incidents of the work relationship require evaluation to
ensure that no one factor is decisive).
76. See id. at 498 (identifying that the ability to unilaterally terminate drivers
creates a heavy inference of employee status).
77. See 512 F.3d at 1096-97 (reviewing the NLRB’s decision under the manner and
means analysis of the right-to-control test).
78. See id. at 1100-01 (stating that, ultimately, no one factor is dispositive in the
application of the right-to-control test and the inquiry mandates an exploration into the
totality of the circumstances involved in the relationship between the putative
employee and her employer).
79. See id. (finding that a constraint on the ability of drivers to exercise their
limited entrepreneurial opportunity is weighed like any other factor in favor of
employee status under the right-to-control analysis).
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F. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB
In 1998, FedEx Corporation acquired Roadway Package Systems, Inc.80
The new entity, FedEx Home Delivery, employs almost 4,000 drivers who
deliver packages on 5,049 routes based out of over 500 terminals
nationwide.81 The underlying NLRB representational decision that gave
rise to FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB concerned two terminals in
Wilmington, Massachusetts, consisting of thirty-three single route drivers.82
FedEx, in contesting a union representation election sought by its delivery
drivers, asserted the affirmative defense that the delivery drivers were
independent contractors, not statutory employees, and that they were
thereby excluded from a statutorily mandated election administered by the
NLRB.83
1. The Representation Decision
In 2006, the NLRB’s Regional Director certified the thirty-three single
route delivery drivers as employees under the NLRA for the purpose of the
representational election, but excluded, as statutory supervisors, the
delivery drivers who had contracted for multiple routes.84 In making her
determination that the single-route delivery drivers were employees under
section 2(3) of the NLRA, the Regional Director relied on the facts that
FedEx had appearance requirements for drivers and vehicles that exceed
requirements dictated by federal statute and that the drivers performed a
regular and essential function of FedEx Home’s normal operations.85 The
Regional Director also noted that FedEx placed contractual restraints on the
drivers’ pursuit of outside entrepreneurial opportunities; retained the ability
to unilaterally alter or terminate drivers’ routes; mandated drivers to
provide a FedEx-approved vehicle and driver for delivery assignments
from Tuesday through Saturday; and provided incentives for drivers to
comply with company policies.86
80. FedEx Home Delivery, N.L.R.B. Cases 1-RC-22034, 1-RC-22035, at 6 (Sept.
20, 2006).
81. Id. at 6-7 n.9.
82. See id. at 7 (explaining the exclusion of the drivers with multiple routes from
the bargaining unit, as they were considered statutory supervisors pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(11) (2006)).
83. See FedEx Home Delivery, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 2007 WL 2858933, at *1
(Sept. 28, 2007) (urging the Board to vacate the Administrative Law Judge’s refusal to
bargain remedy in favor of the drivers).
84. See FedEx Home Delivery, N.L.R.B. Cases 1-RC-22034, 1-RC-22035, at 46-47
(Sept. 20, 2006) (finding that the multiple route drivers exerted control over other hired
drivers for the benefit of FedEx).
85. See id. at 38-39 (noting that drivers did not substantially pursue outside
business interests while working for FedEx).
86. See id. at 39-40 (explaining that the factors which supported FedEx’s claim that
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Additionally, the Regional Director found several factors that supported
FedEx’s contention that the drivers were independent contractors, including
the drivers’ ability to hire substitutes that met FedEx approval, ownership
of their own vehicles, and the words of the contract which described the
drivers as independent contractors.87 The Regional Director, however,
concluded that any apparent freedom the drivers had to set their own
schedules and hire substitutes was substantially limited by time constraints
placed on the drivers’ workday and by the fact that drivers were unable to
refuse to make deliveries without being disciplined by FedEx.88 In
applying the right-to-control test pursuant to NLRB precedent, the
Regional Director was ultimately not persuaded that the evidence favoring
independent contractor status—including the unique feature of the drivers’
contracts that allowed them to assign their contractual rights to a route to a
person that met FedEx’s approval—countervailed the evidence in favor of
employee status.89
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 25, subsequently
won the election at the two FedEx Home terminals and the Regional
Director certified the election results.90 FedEx, however, did not fulfill its
statutory obligation to bargain with the newly elected union.91 In 2007, the
NLRB ruled that FedEx committed unfair labor practices in violation of its
duty to bargain in good faith by refusing to bargain with the union.92 At the
unfair labor practice proceeding, FedEx admitted that it had refused to
bargain with the union, but again offered the affirmative defense that the
drivers were not statutory employees, but independent contractors.93 The
NLRB did not allow FedEx to submit new evidence of nationwide data of
drivers who had profited from the sales of their routes because it could
have been provided during the initial representational proceeding and was
the drivers were independent contractors were mitigated by the substantial control that
FedEx exerted over its drivers).
87. See id. at 11, 13, 28 (detailing the methods that delivery drivers use to acquire
vans pursuant to FedEx’s requirements and with FedEx’s direct assistance, but noting
that FedEx does not grant loans to purchase or lease vans nor does it directly supply
them to drivers).
88. See id. at 39-40 (concluding that FedEx’s ultimate control gives the relationship
between FedEx and the drivers the necessary indicia that the drivers are statutory
“employees” within the meaning of section 2(3) of the NLRA).
89. See id. at 44 (noting that these very factors favoring contractor status have been
present in prior case law, but were deemed insufficient, in light of other factors
favoring employee status, to carry the day).
90. FedEx Home Delivery, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 2007 WL 2858933, at *2 (Sept.
28, 2007).
91. See id. (highlighting that FedEx expressly refused to bargain with the union in
two separate letters because it challenged the Regional Director’s determination).
92. See id. at *1 (granting the NLRB’s General Counsel’s motion for summary
judgment).
93. Id.
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immaterial to the determination of employee status under the right-tocontrol test.94 Accordingly, the Board ordered FedEx to bargain with the
delivery drivers’ elected union; FedEx appealed that order to the D.C.
Circuit.95
2. The D.C. Circuit’s Holding
The D.C. Circuit vacated the decision of the NLRB and agreed with
FedEx that the drivers were statutorily exempt from coverage by the Act
and, therefore, that FedEx did not commit an unfair labor practice in
refusing to bargain with the union.96 The court based its decision on the
“significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss,” as opposed to the
traditional common law right-to-control test analysis, in deciding that the
delivery drivers were independent contractors.97 In applying this test, the
court pointed out that drivers were free to use their vehicles for personal
business ventures on the two days when they were not delivering packages
for FedEx, were free to hire substitutes that met FedEx’s approval, and that
the drivers could sell their routes at a profit without FedEx’s involvement
in the sale price.98 The D.C. Circuit stated unequivocally that its analysis
would no longer hinge on the cumbersome totality of the circumstances
inquiry mandated under the right-to-control test.99 Instead, it crafted
something akin to a bright-line test that turned on entrepreneurial
opportunities afforded to putative employees, marking a distinct departure
from D.C. Circuit precedent and that of the other federal circuits.100
94. See id. (forestalling FedEx from introducing new, previously available
evidence).
95. See id. at *3 (ordering FedEx to recognize and bargain with the union in good
faith at the union’s request).
96. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 503-04 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(holding that the evidence in the record supported a finding that drivers were
independent contractors and thus, not reaching the question of whether FedEx had
committed any unfair labor practices).
97. See id. at 497 n.3 (shifting the emphasis of the common law control test to
entrepreneurial opportunity on the grounds that the latter provides a more qualitative
assessment of the relationship between the parties through which to evaluate the factors
of the common law test). Compare C.C. Eastern v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (holding that drivers who retained the right to hire their own employees were
essentially independent contractors), with Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB,
292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that a driver’s inability to hire others did
not constitute indicia of any entrepreneurial opportunity and that the drivers were
therefore employees under section 2(3) of the NLRA).
98. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 498-500 (underscoring that the driver’s
ability to reap additional profits without consent from FedEx was “no small thing in
evaluating ‘entrepreneurial opportunity’”).
99. See id. at 497 (noting that a test hinging on entrepreneurialism would not lend
itself to “purely mechanical” application).
100. See id. (criticizing the common law test for not being amenable to a bright-line
rule).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The D.C. Circuit Erred by Departing from the Right-to-Control Test
When the D.C. Circuit decided to emphasize a putative employee’s
“significant entrepreneurial opportunity” over the traditional control that an
employer exerts over the “manner and means” that are used in the
performance of work tasks, the court shifted the emphasis under the Act
away from the general principles of agency law.101 At the heart of the law
of agency is a determination of the degree to which a principal exerts
control over the actions of its agents; therefore, a test that fails to look to
the degree of control exerted by an employer over putative employees is
out of step with this basic principle.102 Although the court proclaimed that
this shift was logical and in accord with precedent, the actual effect
contravenes clear congressional intent, Supreme Court precedent, and wellsettled NLRB law that expressly instruct that principles of agency law
should be used for the employee status determination.103 The D.C. Circuit,
therefore, by shifting emphasis away from the right-to-control test and
instead relying on entrepreneurialism, erred in interpreting the definition of
statutory employees under the Act because all factors incident to the work
relationship, including but not limited to entrepreneurialism, are given
equal weight under the right-to-control test which Congress specifically
endorsed in the Taft-Hartley Act.104
Many of the right-to-control test factors that had previously been found
sufficient by the D.C. Circuit to sustain a finding of employee status, such
as the stringent appearance requirements in Orlando, were present in

101. See id. at 501 (claiming the court’s decision in Corporate Express interpreting
section 2(3) of the NLRA represented a conscious shift to entrepreneurialism); see also
Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780-81 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding
that a complete lack of entrepreneurial opportunity was sufficient to create a
presumption of employee status under the Act).
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (stating that an agency
relationship is defined and constrained by the control exacted by a principal); see also
N. Am. Van Lines v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (criticizing the NLRB
for confusing control of the manner and means performance with control that an
employer might exert over the end product or service).
103. See Fed Ex Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 508 (Garland, J., dissenting) (noting
that of the circuit court opinions which attempt to stray from longstanding agency law
principles, the majority only cited Corporate Express); NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of
Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (reiterating the congressional preference for using
general principles of agency law to determine the NLRB’s jurisdiction over
employees).
104. Contra FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 504 (Brown, J.) (finding that the
factors supporting employee status under the Act pursuant to the right-to-control test
were “clearly outweighed” by the drivers’ entrepreneurial opportunities).
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FedEx.105 The D.C. Circuit, however, chose to rely substantially on its
holding in Corporate Express in vacating the Board’s decision that the
drivers were statutory employees under the Act.106 The court determined
that the Board had erred by not giving appropriate weight to evidence that
the delivery drivers could additionally profit from their positions, either by
having more than one route or by selling the contractual rights to their
route.107
Corporate Express, however, does not support a conclusive shift in
emphasis of the employee determination away from the common law
factors, because in that case, the entrepreneurial opportunity that the
employees lacked related to scheduling, as opposed to discrete
opportunities to profit from one’s position.108 In FedEx, the delivery
drivers equally lacked entrepreneurial opportunity as it was defined in
Corporate Express due to the substantial amount of control that FedEx
exercised over the timing of driver deliveries.109 Put simply, Corporate
Express stands for the proposition that an entrepreneurial opportunity
inhering in the manner and means of the performance of work tasks is an
aspect of, but does not take the place of, the right-to-control test.110 In
contrast, the FedEx court read Corporate Express to explicitly shift the
emphasis of the employee determination away from a test that hinges on an
employer’s control over the manner and means of work performance.111
Under the right-to-control test, the ten factors listed in the Restatement
are non-exhaustive and no single factor is determinative.112 Therefore,
factors that may be very important in one case may be less important or
105. Compare City Cab Co. of Orlando v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 261, 266 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (citing extensive appearance requirements as a strong indicium of employee
status), with FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 500 (regarding stringent appearance
requirements as unpersuasive under a test that favors entrepreneurialism).
106. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 497 (stating that the “unwieldy” nature
of the control inquiry justified the shift to entrepreneurial opportunity as a proxy for the
right-to-control test).
107. Id. at 501.
108. See id. at 508 (Garland, J., dissenting) (arguing that Corporate Express does
not stand for the broad shift claimed by the majority).
109. See id. at 499 n.5 (Brown, J.) (noting that FedEx mandates that drivers provide
service five days a week and leave their vans overnight to be stocked with packages).
But cf. N. Am. Van Lines v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that a
driver’s complete control over her appearance indicated that she was an independent
contractor).
110. See Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 779-80 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (analyzing the common law factors indicating control over the manner and
means of work performance before discussing entrepreneurialism).
111. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 501 (positing that the shift to
entrepreneurialism is an evolution from the common law right-to-control test).
112. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968) (declaring that
there is no short-hand formula for determining employee status for purposes of the
NLRA and all incidences of the relationship must be weighed).
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even non-existent in another context.113 Moreover, both the Supreme Court
and the Board have emphasized the Board’s lack of power to change the
right-to-control test.114 Even if, as the D.C. Circuit suggests, the Board
urged a shift in emphasis away from the right-to-control test towards
entrepreneurialism in Corporate Express, it did so erroneously because the
Board would not be undertaking the central inquiry into control that forms
the core of the law of agency.115
According to the FedEx court, a substantial showing of entrepreneurial
opportunity on the part of a putative employee will outweigh a strong
showing of employer control under the right-to-control test.116 As
demonstrated by the adverse congressional response to Hearst Publications
in the Taft-Hartley Amendments, reemphasizing the employee
determination under the NLRA away from the control inquiry at the core of
agency law is contrary to express congressional intent.117 The effect of
such a shift by the D.C. Circuit away from common law agency principles
effectively removes persons that Congress considered to be employees
from the protections of the NLRA.118

113. See Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. 884, 891 (1998) (holding
that not all factors will present themselves in every case under the common law rightto-control test).
114. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995) (holding that
courts must review the Board with careful scrutiny when it appears they have deviated
from the common law principles of agency); see also Dial-A-Mattress Operating
Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. at 894 (noting, in the wake of Town & Country Electric, that the
NLRB is powerless to deviate from the common law principles of agency law for
determining the NLRB’s jurisdictional authority).
115. See St. Joseph News-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. 474, 477-78 (2005) (remarking that
Supreme Court precedent has long held that the common law right-to-control test is not
only the test to determine employee status for purposes of the NLRA, but that the
NLRB is not capable of deviating from that test); see also FedEx Home Delivery, 563
F.3d at 510 (Garland, J., dissenting) (stating that pursuant to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), only the NLRB or the Supreme
Court has the authority to change the emphasis of the test used to determine employee
status for purposes of the NLRA).
116. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 503 (Brown, J.) (holding that even
barring the common law factors, the entrepreneurial opportunity afforded delivery
drivers makes the case “particularly straightforward”).
117. See United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. at 256 (noting that after NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA to
expressly instruct courts and the NLRB to apply the common law principles of
agency).
118. See Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 94 (favoring a broad interpretation of
the term employee for the purposes of the NLRA); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006)
(making very few exclusions from the understanding of “employees” under the
NLRA).
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B. The Employee Determination Is Best Left to the Right-to-Control Test’s
Analysis of the Manner and Means of an Employee’s Work Performance
Although neither appellate courts nor the NLRB may necessarily shift
the employee determination towards a test that eschews the common law
right-to-control inquiry, entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss is still
a factor within the context of the control test.119 Since the dispositive
question under the right-to-control test asks who controls the manner and
means of work performance, an individual who possesses an
entrepreneurial stake in that performance is more likely to be considered an
independent contractor than an employee.120 The D.C. Circuit erred in
deciding that the entrepreneurial opportunity afforded FedEx’s delivery
drivers was determinative because those opportunities were not tied to the
manner and means of work performance, but rather to contractual rights
governing the employee-employer relationship.
Entrepreneurial opportunity aids the employee determination under the
NLRA within the multifactor right-to-control test when the principal thrust
of the test is preserved.121 The twin criteria, which strike at the heart of
who controls the manner and means of performance, are: (1) whether the
putative employee is in fact a separate and distinct entity from the
employer; and (2) whether the putative employee has the opportunity to
work smarter, rather than harder, to increase her compensation.122

119. See Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(interpreting the right-to-control test to encompass entrepreneurialism); accord N. Am.
Van Lines v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 599-600 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that an
examination of entrepreneurialism aids the employee determination under the right-tocontrol test).
120. Compare C.C. Eastern v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing
Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. Seafarers Int’l Union of N. Am. v. NLRB,
603 F.2d 863, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1978)) (stating that the extent of supervision over the
manner and means of the workers’ performance is the most important element to be
considered), with N. Am. Van Lines, 869 F.2d at 599-600 (vacating the NLRB’s finding
of employee status, in part, because of the significant entrepreneurial risks assumed by
the putative employees over the exercise of the manner and means of performance).
121. See Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 94 (holding that considerable deference
is given to the NLRB when interpreting the statutory context of the NLRA according to
the principles of agency law); see also NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254,
256 (1968) (affirming that Congress intended for the NLRB to make employee status
determinations in accordance with the principles of agency law).
122. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006) (noting that
employee status accrues when the “principal controls or has the right to control the
manner and means of the agent’s performance of work”); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF EMP. LAW § 1.01 cmt. a (2009) (Second Tentative Draft) (noting that the
Supreme Court has held on many occasions that the right-to-control test seeks to
determine whether an individual is providing services as an independent business).
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1. An Individual Who Holds Herself out as a Separate and Distinct
Business Entity Is Inherently an Independent Contractor
When the D.C. Circuit turned away from the right-to-control test in favor
of entrepreneurialism, the court did so without regard for one of the basic
purposes behind the test: if the employer relinquishes enough control to
classify an individual as an independent contractor, that individual most
likely will be a separate and distinct entity from the employer.123 D.C.
Circuit jurisprudence has traditionally hinged on the independence of the
workers in question when applying the right-to-control test.124 As the D.C.
Circuit noted in both Local 221 and C.C. Eastern, the core of the
independent contractor analysis focuses on whether the individual is
actually independent from the employer during their employment.125
Unlike the drivers in FedEx, the drivers in Local 221 were free to choose
whether they would provide or even complete their services on any given
day without fear of reprisal.126 Furthermore, in C.C. Eastern, neither the
drivers nor their machines were governed by any meaningful appearance
requirement to identify them as C.C. Eastern employees.127 However, in
FedEx, the D.C. Circuit failed to consider that it was precisely their FedEx
emblazoned uniforms and heavily trademarked vehicles that would
distinguish the delivery drivers in the eyes of the public.128 FedEx also
contractually mandated that the drivers provide vehicles and work
performance five days a week—the equivalent length of the standard work
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) (listing various
factors to consider in determining whether an individual is an independent contractor);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (2006) (observing that an agent
engaged in a distinct business or occupation provides indicia of independent contractor
status); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP. LAW § 1.01 (2009) (Second Tentative
Draft) (stating that when one renders services outside the employer’s “entrepreneurial
control over the manner and means by which the services are performed,” she lacks
indicia of employee status).
124. See, e.g., C.C. Eastern, 60 F.3d at 858 (declaring that the right-to-control test
is largely a function of the amount of supervision exercised by the employer over the
means and manner of work performance and that steps to “monitor, evaluate, and
improve the results” of work fall outside the scope of true supervision).
125. See Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 94 (holding that “moonlighting,” or
performing another job outside the hours of normal employment, in no way weighs
upon the employer-employee analysis for purposes of the NLRA).
126. See Construction Employees Union, Local 221 v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 1238, 1242
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (emphasizing that the drivers’ complete independence to choose when
and if they would work was an important part of the court’s right-to-control analysis).
127. See C.C. Eastern, 60 F.3d at 858 (finding this factor—a general lack of
uniformity—influential in the right-to-control analysis because it indicated
independence).
128. Compare N. Am. Van Lines v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(finding that the lack of appearance requirements to identify the cabs weighed in favor
of independent contractor status), with FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492,
500 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (mentioning, in passing, the appearance requirements for “man
and machine” to display FedEx’s logo as specified per the contract).
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week.129
Independence from the principal is one of the primary concerns of
agency law; therefore any inquiry must uncover how independent an
individual truly is from her principal to sustain her designation as an
independent contractor.130 The agency concept of apparent authority
envisions those instances when an agent’s actions will incur liability for her
principal.131 Thus, the less independent the agent appears, the more she
will engender reliance in third parties that her actions are on behalf of her
apparent principal.132 The D.C. Circuit failed to consider that a shift
towards entrepreneurialism, on its own, does not account for the
independence inquiry mandated under agency law.133
Furthermore, workers who have no independent control over the manner
and means of their performance are likely not distinct or separate enough
from their principal to be considered independent contractors.134 As the
D.C. Circuit correctly noted, even though FedEx does not designate its
delivery drivers’ routes, it does assign packages to be delivered and gives
only limited opportunities for drivers to deviate from their scheduled
deliveries on a daily basis.135
Finally, FedEx maintains ultimate control over almost all of the avenues
through which its delivery drivers may exercise their purported
entrepreneurial interest.136 Though drivers may arrange for substitutes and

129. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 499 n.5 (noting that drivers were “only
obligated” to provide their services to FedEx five days a week, leaving them open, in
the off time, to engage in other delivery activities).
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006).
131. See id. § 3.03 (stating that apparent authority is created when a third party
reasonably believes the agent to be authorized to bind the principal).
132. See id. § 7.07 cmt. c (defining independent courses of conduct outside of
employment as being outside an employer’s liability).
133. See C.C. Eastern v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 858, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (delving
into the intricate analysis of supervision required under the right-to-control test by, for
example, distinguishing incentive programs geared to motivate workers and increase
overall quality from genuine supervision over how one’s tasks are accomplished).
134. See Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 381 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (deciding that cab drivers were independent contractors, even though they had no
equity stake in their vehicles or contracts, because they were left to conduct ninety-five
percent of their business independently of their putative employer).
135. Compare FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 500-01 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (noting that FedEx not only controlled how many packages each delivery driver
would be responsible for daily, but also that drivers could only refuse packages in two
specific circumstances limited by FedEx’s discretion), with N. Am. Van Lines v.
NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that delivery truck drivers were
independent contractors, in part, because they had no set load and the drivers had to be
convinced through use of “threats and promises of benefits” to carry particular loads).
136. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 499 (stating that replacement drivers
may be installed, but only so as long as they are “qualified” pursuant to FedEx’s
standard).
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may even sell their routes, FedEx still holds substitutes to the same basic
performance standards to which it holds its delivery drivers.137 This veto
power leaves little room for the drivers to exercise their replacement
opportunities independently.
Since independence goes hand-in-hand with independent contractor
status, the D.C. Circuit substantially strayed from this central tenet of
agency law by focusing instead on entrepreneurialism, which on its own
does not account for the independence inquiry envisioned by Congress and
affirmed by decades of precedent.138 FedEx does not give drivers the
opportunity to increase their daily compensation because it controls the
manner and means of employment.139 Only those individuals who have an
entrepreneurial opportunity stemming from their independence should have
the protections of the NLRA withheld from them.
2. Entrepreneurial Opportunity Attaches to Employees Who Are Afforded
the Right to Work Smarter—Not Harder—to Increase Compensation
Another critical distinction between employees and independent
contractors under the right-to-control test is that independent contractors
may increase their compensation by working smarter, not just harder.140
The D.C. Circuit crafted and struggled to apply this distinction in both
Corporate Express and FedEx.141 The delivery drivers at issue in FedEx,
however, have no entrepreneurial interest in the manner and means of their
performance and, thus, are only afforded the opportunity to work harder for
increased compensation by delivering more packages in the same amount
of time they are allotted to deliver their normal load.142
137. See FedEx Home Delivery, N.L.R.B. Cases 1-RC-22034, 1-RC-22035, at 32
(Sept. 20, 2006) (dictating that replacement drivers must meet standards outlined by
FedEx pursuant to the operating agreement with the delivery drivers).
138. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 517 (Garland, J., dissenting) (observing
that neither Corporate Express nor C.C. Eastern used entrepreneurialism to shift
emphasis fundamentally away from the right-to-control test’s independence inquiry).
139. See id. at 500-01 (Brown, J.) (conceding, through a recitation of factors that
favor employee status under the manner and means inquiry, that FedEx’s business
model is distinguishable from other delivery driver cases where employee status was
not found to exist by the NLRB).
140. See Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(observing that an entrepreneur is afforded the opportunity to take advantage of their
independence from their principal to practice ingenuity in the economic risks they
take).
141. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 503 (suggesting that applying the
concept of working smarter, not harder is consistent with NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of
Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968)).
142. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 515-16 (Garland, J., dissenting) (noting
that FedEx constrains their delivery driver’s entrepreneurial opportunity to assign the
contractual rights of their routes to others); see also C.C. Eastern v. NLRB, 60 F.3d
855, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that workers’ theoretical rights for
entrepreneurialism do not add weight to their status as independent contractors).
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Like individuals who are paid per piece they produce, or “piece-rate,”
the FedEx drivers are only accorded the opportunity to work harder, not
smarter to increase their compensation.143 Piece-rate work has long been
recognized as supporting an individual’s status as an employee under the
NLRA.144 The question therefore turns to the means by which individuals
can increase piece-rate production and, in turn, compensation.145
FedEx controls the number of packages that drivers may deliver in one
day.146 Even during peak season, when drivers typically hire helpers to
assist in delivering their extra package load, their compensation is not
necessarily increased despite the increased cost of the hired helper.147 The
D.C. Circuit may have articulated one way to consider entrepreneurialism,
however, the court failed to apply this distinction to the only actual means
by which drivers may increase their compensation: delivering additional
packages.148 Instead, the D.C. Circuit analyzed the ability of the delivery
drivers to either expand their contractually covered routes or sell their
vehicles and contracts to another individual, even though these actions have
no impact on how many packages they can deliver, and thus, their
compensation.149 In failing to focus on the actual performance of work
tasks, the D.C. Circuit did not engage in the central analysis needed for
jurisdictional purposes of the NLRA: whether the ability to work smarter,
rather than harder, is retained by the drivers through their control over the
manner and means of work performance.150
143. See FedEx Home Delivery, N.L.R.B. Cases 1-RC-22034, 1-RC-22035, at 21-22
(Sept. 20, 2006) (detailing how delivery drivers are paid per stop and per package
delivered).
144. See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 435 (1969) (ruling that a union
committed an unfair labor practice by bargaining for higher piece-rate compensation
for bargaining unit employees); see also Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 641,
654 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (sustaining an NLRB remedial order for unfair labor practices
committed against piece-rate employees).
145. See Coronet Casuals, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 304, 323 (1973) (holding that piecerate work is a mandatory subject of bargaining because it affects the terms and
conditions of employment).
146. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 512 (Garland, J., dissenting) (reiterating
the NLRB Regional Director’s findings that FedEx not only fixes the routes and
packages which the delivery drivers are responsible for, but also retains the contractual
right to unilaterally reconfigure a driver’s territory).
147. See FedEx Home Delivery, Cases 1-RC-22034, 1-RC-22035, at 28-29 (noting
that drivers usually make use of FedEx’s temporary driver service when finding
replacements or supplemental drivers and, further, that supplemental drivers are hired
when the volume of packages each driver is expected to deliver per day increases
during the Christmas holiday season).
148. See id. at 19, 21-24 (stating that drivers may request to deliver more packages
from FedEx, after which FedEx can reconfigure the drivers’ routes).
149. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 499-500 (finding that drivers’ option to
service additional routes, even if unexercised, was more substantial than the control
that FedEx exerted over the drivers).
150. See id. at 500 (emphasizing the “novel” opportunity for drivers to legally assign
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C. The NLRB Should Be Afforded the Most Deference when It Has Chosen
Between Two Fairly Conflicting Viewpoints and Applied Well-Settled Law
The Supreme Court has long held that appellate courts should grant the
NLRB considerable deference when interpreting the NLRA as long as the
NLRB has chosen between two fairly conflicting views and has properly
applied the law.151 The D.C. Circuit, however, set aside the NLRB’s
determination that FedEx’s delivery drivers are statutory employees for two
reasons. First, the D.C. Circuit held that pursuant to Corporate Express,
the NLRB was required to emphasize the delivery drivers’ entrepreneurial
opportunities.152 Second, the D.C. Circuit found that the NLRB erred by
not allowing FedEx to introduce evidence that would speak to system-wide
opportunities for entrepreneurialism.153 Both the decision to exclude
evidence and the NLRB’s application of the right-to-control test are well
within the broad range of authority granted to the NLRB for the purposes
of effectuating the NLRA.154
Furthermore, because the evidence
considered properly spoke to the manner and means of performance work
tasks, the NLRB rightly came to the conclusion that the driver’s
entrepreneurial opportunity, in terms of the transferability of their
employment contracts, did not render them independent contractors.155
Finally, the D.C. Circuit’s rationale in Corporate Express, namely the
“shift” to entrepreneurialism, was not relied upon at the agency level. This
brings the decision into direct conflict with the rule commanding that “in
dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency
alone is authorized to make,” a reviewing court “must judge the propriety
of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”156
their contractual rights to service a particular route for FedEx over the traditional
manner and means inquiry).
151. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (withholding
from appellate courts the ability to review NLRB orders de novo, even if the reviewing
court would have reached a different conclusion).
152. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 503 (holding that Corporate Express
explicitly shifted the test for employee status to one favoring entrepreneurial
opportunity for gain or loss).
153. See id. at 504 (finding that the NLRB’s failure to consider nationwide data of
FedEx delivery drivers’ sale of route contracts warranted reversal of the employee
status determination).
154. See ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994) (holding that
the NLRB’s views are entitled to the greatest deference); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that courts
and agencies alike must yield to the intent of Congress when it has unambiguously
expressed its intent).
155. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995) (asserting that
broad interpretation of the term employee is favored for purposes of the NLRA
consistent with common law of agency); see also Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S.
883, 891 (1984) (granting great deference to the NLRB for purposes of defining an
employee).
156. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947) (holding that an
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Since the Board has no specialty in agency law that a federal appellate
court lacks, a reviewing circuit court is required to give the NLRB
deference to the extent that the NLRB has chosen between two fairly
conflicting views.157 However, when the D.C. Circuit failed to give the
Board deference in its finding that FedEx had committed unfair labor
practices, the court employed its own test for employee status that did not
comport with agency principles.158 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit erred in
reversing the NLRB’s determination without fully explaining why the
NLRB’s application of the right-to-control test was unreasonable.159
Additionally, the Supreme Court has favored a broad interpretation of
the term employee for purposes of the NLRA.160 Accordingly, the Court
has mandated that only if the NLRB’s decision is not based upon the
principles of agency law do appellate courts examine the NLRB’s
determination of employee status.161
When the NLRB did not allow FedEx to introduce nationwide evidence
of drivers exercising entrepreneurial opportunities through the transfer of
their employment contract to a third party, they did so properly because the
evidence had no bearing on the manner and means of work performance.162
The evidence excluded by the NLRB was irrelevant to the representational
decision under the principles of the law of agency; the D.C. Circuit, as a

executive agency’s decision may only be judged on the basis of the rationale contained
within that decision and that a court may not substitute its own wisdom, out of respect
for separation of powers); see also Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 332 N.L.R.B. 1522,
1522 (2000) (finding that the individuals at issue were employees for purposes of
section 2(3) after applying the common law right-to-control test).
157. Cf. N. Am. Van Lines v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating
that the D.C. Circuit will not grant the NLRB great, or even normal, deference).
158. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(Garland, J., dissenting) (proposing that the NLRB has consistently fulfilled its
statutory obligation for employee determination by utilizing the right-to-control test
and not a test that favors entrepreneurialism).
159. See id. at 500-01 (majority opinion) (ignoring vast factual findings by the
NLRB’s Regional Director to hold that FedEx control over the manner and means of
work performance is insufficient to override the evidence that delivery drivers may sell
their route contracts to a third party at a profit).
160. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 891 (stating that the NLRB is the agency
chosen by Congress to administer the NLRA and to define its scope through its
interpretation of the term employee).
161. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968)
(acknowledging the deference given to the NLRB’s construction of the term employee
under the NLRA, so long as that construction has its foundation in the principles of the
common law of agency).
162. See FedEx Home Delivery, N.L.R.B. Cases 1-RC-22034, 1-RC-22035 at 40, 44
(Sept. 20, 2006) (noting that contractual rights to sell a delivery route are not sufficient
to establish independent contractor status); accord Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326
N.L.R.B. 842, 846-47 (1998) (holding that the right of a person to sell her contractual
rights pertaining to providing service for the putative employer does not bear on the
employer’s control of the individual).
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practical matter, owed the NLRB’s decision considerable deference.163
D. The D.C. Circuit Has Created a Substantial Circuit Split in Applying
Section 2(3)
With the exception of the D.C. Circuit, the other courts of appeals
continue to apply the multi-factor analysis mandated under the right-tocontrol test to determine employee status under the NLRA.164 Both the
Ninth and the Sixth Circuits, which have both heard cases relating to
employee status after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Corporate Express,
chose not to shift their analysis to entrepreneurialism.165 In both those
cases, a shift to entrepreneurialism could have affected the outcome.166
Since FedEx expressly shifted the analysis of the factual context of
employment away from the right-to-control test toward entrepreneurial
opportunity, the D.C. Circuit has created a circuit split under which
individuals could be independent contractors in one circuit, but employees
in another.167
Both Time Auto and Friendly Cab had several elements in common with
FedEx, including the contractual label of “independent contractor” assigned
to the drivers; however only the D.C. Circuit used such elements to shift its
emphasis toward entrepreneurialism by making it dispositive.168 Like their
counterparts in FedEx, the drivers in Time Auto not only had the ability to
hire substitutes to work on their behalf, but they could even take the extra

163. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995) (maintaining that
the NLRB receives considerable deference for its interpretation of the outer limits of
the term employee).
164. See, e.g., NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2008)
(reaffirming the Supreme Court’s preference for the right-to-control test for purposes of
the NLRA).
165. See id. at 1099-1101 (continuing to look to all the incidences of the work
relationship, including entrepreneurial opportunities); Time Auto Transp. v. NLRB,
377 F.3d 496, 499-500 (6th Cir. 2004) (continuing to apply the right-to-control test’s
multifactor analysis).
166. Compare Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d at 1097-98 (noting that the fact that
drivers were able to keep all fares and tips in exchange for a flat rental for their
vehicles created a strong inference of independent contractor status that overcame the
drivers’ lack of control in other respects), with FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563
F.3d 498-500 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (observing that the ability of drivers to expand and
assign their rights and duties under their contract with FedEx demonstrated that the
drivers were independent contractors regardless of factors under the right-to-control
test).
167. See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 8, at 7 (urging the D.C. Circuit to avoid
a circuit split that was inconsistent with Supreme Court authority by rehearing FedEx).
168. Compare FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 499 (declaring that the ability to
hire substitutes was a significant factor in validating a shift towards
entrepreneurialism), with Time Auto Transp., 377 F.3d at 499 (declining to focus on the
drivers’ ability to hire substitutes in favor of the other factors present under the right-tocontrol test).
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step of independently incorporating.169 However, in both Time Auto and
Friendly Cab, the courts were more concerned with applying the principles
of agency under the right-to-control test, which includes an inquiry into the
entrepreneurial opportunities for gain or loss, rather than shifting their
emphasis towards entrepreneurialism alone.170 Significantly, when the
Friendly Cab court undertook its entrepreneurialism analysis, it relied
heavily on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Corporate Express, but still did
not go as far as shifting away from an inquiry into who controls the manner
and means of work performance.171
In their application of the facts to law, both the Time Auto and Friendly
Cab courts reached conclusions contrary to decisions they might have
made had they focused on entrepreneurialism like the FedEx court. The
factors that the D.C. Circuit found unpersuasive under their entrepreneurial
opportunities test tipped the balance for both the Ninth and Sixth Circuits
in determining that the NLRB had correctly designated the drivers as
employees under the traditional right-to-control test.172 In FedEx, Time
Auto, and Friendly Cab, the respective companies had strict appearance
requirements, disciplinary regimes to promote drivers’ performance, and
the ability to unilaterally terminate their relationships with the drivers for
poor performance.173 However, in none of these cases did the employer set
a route or dictate the way that driving would be performed.174 In all three
cases, the employer had ultimate control over the amount of work
performed in a given day and, therefore, over the amount of compensation
each driver could expect to receive for a given day’s work.175
169. See Time Auto Transp., 377 F.3d at 499-500 (noting that the elements of
control that Time Auto exercised over its drivers warranted a finding of employee
status, despite the presence of some hallmarks of entrepreneurialism).
170. See id. at 499 (relying on United Insurance Co. of Am. as the basis for applying
the right-to-control test); see also Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d at 1095-96 (upholding
the NLRB because it properly applied the law of agency in making the determination).
171. See Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d at 1097-98 (understanding the analysis of
entrepreneurialism as one additional factor under the right-to-control test of Corporate
Express).
172. See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 500-01 (passing over strict
appearance requirements as furthering customer service goals rather than
demonstrating control over the manner and means of performance).
173. See Time Auto Transp. 377 F.3d at 498 (finding that the drivers were
terminable at will for poor performance and that drivers could be “starved out” by the
company if they were unsatisfied with their performance); Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d
at 1101 (evaluating the extensive, mandatory dress code for drivers as evidence of
employer control over the manner and means of performance).
174. See, e.g., Time Auto Transp., 377 F.3d at 498 (observing that drivers were told
when to drive, not how to drive).
175. Compare FedEx Home Delivery, N.L.R.B. Cases 1-RC-22034, 1-RC-22035, at
21-22, 40 (Sept. 20, 2006) (explaining that the drivers are paid by package delivered
and that FedEx does not determine the size of their load), with Time Auto Transp., 377
F.3d at 498 (finding the fact that drivers were forced to wait around for assignments
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The only cognizable difference between FedEx, Time Auto, and Friendly
Cab is the ability that FedEx’s drivers had to transfer the contractual rights
to their routes.176 Even though FedEx provided evidence that its drivers
had profited from such sales, the company still retained ultimate control to
ratify or not ratify such transfers.177 Because of the striking similarities
between the factual context of FedEx, Time Auto, and Friendly Cab, it is
likely that the other circuit courts would have achieved a different result
under the right-to-control test and concluded that FedEx delivery drivers
were statutory employees, protected for their union and concerted
activities.178
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in FedEx puts workers who are in the most
danger of not receiving the protection of the NLRA at risk because NLRB
classifications are not directly appealable under the NLRA to federal courts
and because employers essentially now have a choice of law when
defending unfair labor practices on the grounds of employee status under
the NLRA.179 In the best case scenario, this will prevent workers who
would otherwise be classified under the NLRA as employees from
enjoying protection for their union activity and attempts at collective
bargaining.180 In the worst case, this decision will encourage employers to
preemptively engage in unfair labor practices against their “employees” in
hopes of using their status as independent contractors under the NLRA as
an affirmative defense on appeal in the D.C. Circuit, which always has
jurisdiction over appeals from NLRB decisions.181
Common carriers—namely freight, delivery, and taxi drivers—have had
the most trouble receiving protection under the NLRA.182 Therefore, a test
indicative of their employee status).
176. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 500 (recognizing the novelty of
contractual assignment of the employment contract under D.C. Circuit precedent).
177. See FedEx Home Delivery, Cases 1-RC-22034, 1-RC-22035, at 33
(constraining the ability to freely sell routes by virtue of the fact that FedEx must be
willing to enter into a contract with the purchaser).
178. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 502-03 (reemphasizing the shift
towards entrepreneurial opportunities begun in Corporate Express to erase any doubt
about the state of the law in the D.C. Circuit).
179. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2006) (stating that the NLRB’s unfair labor practice
proceedings may be reviewed by any of the United States Courts of Appeals or the
Supreme Court).
180. See § 152(3) (excluding independent contractors from the rights guaranteed
under section 7 of the NLRA).
181. See § 160(f) (allowing, in the alternative, review by the United States Court of
Appeals for the circuit in which the alleged unfair labor practice occurred).
182. See N. Am. Van Lines v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (defining
truck drivers as exempt from the NLRA due to their independence); Yellow Taxi Co.
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that hinges upon entrepreneurialism has the potential to be broadly cast and
to further exclude these individuals who have struggled the most to find
protection for their concerted activity and right to collectively bargain.183
Moreover, whereas FedEx arose out of a refusal to bargain with the elected
union representative, the whole gamut of unfair labor practices are
susceptible to the affirmative defense that the aggrieved individuals are not
actually employees.184
Additionally, FedEx’s novel business plan comprises a nationwide
network of almost 4,000 delivery drivers.185 Because the D.C. Circuit
always has jurisdiction over appeals of NLRB remedial orders for unfair
labor practices, the FedEx decision has effectively prevented the
unionization of more than just the delivery drivers at issue in FedEx.186 In
effect, the D.C. Circuit has created a precedent saying that the entire FedEx
Home Delivery Corporation is free to carry on its principal task of
delivering packages without hiring a single “employee.”187
Furthermore, employees represented by unions may lawfully employ a
far greater variety of tactics when bargaining with an employer, such as
staging a strike, which an association of independent contractors could not
do.188 This is because independent contractors are not necessarily immune
to antitrust laws like their employee counterparts, which limits the ability
of FedEx’s delivery drivers to negotiate over the terms and conditions of
of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding taxi drivers to
be independent contractors, even though they have no equity in their vehicles, due to
lack of substantial employer control and driver control over the manner and means of
performance). Compare Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780-81
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that delivery drivers are statutory employees, in part, because
of their lack of any significant entrepreneurial opportunity), with FedEx Home
Delivery, 563 F.3d at 504 (ignoring the right-to-control test factors and deciding that
delivery drivers are independent contractors due to their significant entrepreneurial
opportunity with regards to the transferability of their employment contracts).
183. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 516 (Garland, J., dissenting) (describing
the majority’s attempt to apply a test based on entrepreneurial opportunity as nothing
more than a factual disagreement with the NLRB).
184. See Time Auto Transp. v. NLRB, 377 F.3d 496, 487 (6th Cir. 2004) (observing
that the drivers were terminated for attempting to organize at union amongst
themselves); Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 292 F.3d at 780 (detailing that the order the
NLRB sought to enforce was the reinstatement of drivers fired for the union activity).
185. FedEx Home Delivery, N.L.R.B. Cases 1-RC-22034, 1-RC-22035, at 6-8 (Sept.
20, 2006).
186. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2006) (granting employers the right to bring any unfair
labor practice remedial order issued by the NLRB before the D.C. Circuit and use
entrepreneurial opportunities as an affirmative defense to decertify the bargaining unit).
187. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 503, 592 (holding that FedEx drivers,
an essential part of the FedEx Home Delivery’s normal operations, are not employees
under the NLRA).
188. See generally §§ 157, 158(4) (granting employees the ability to act collectively
to affect the terms and conditions of their employment without fear of discriminatory
retaliation).
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employment—a central protection afforded to individuals covered by the
NLRA.189
The D.C. Circuit has fundamentally changed the focus of the employee
determination under the NLRA from the expressly stated analytical
framework espoused through passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments.190
Though the long-term effects are unknown, the short term effects have
removed from almost 4,000 hard-working “employees,” duped into
becoming entrepreneurs, the ability to seek the right to collectively bargain
for the terms and conditions of their employment and any protection for
their concerted activities to meet those ends.191
V. CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit’s FedEx decision marks a shift away from the
principles of the law of agency which have been used to determine who is
covered by the NLRA since 1947.192 The D.C. Circuit’s reliance on
entrepreneurialism at the expense of the other factors considered under the
common law right-to-control test is not only incorrect in light of the
principles of the common law of agency, but also runs contrary to Supreme
Court precedent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should intervene to
restore the test used for section 2(3) to the analytical framework that
Congress intended and that courts have time and again approved.193 Only
when the Supreme Court chooses to address this issue will it have the
opportunity to mitigate the fallout created by this fundamental shift away
from the traditional interpretation of statutory employees under the NLRA
and bring D.C. Circuit law into accord with the other circuits.194 If not, the
D.C. Circuit will continue to endorse the proposition that an employee in
another circuit court is not necessarily an employee before the D.C. Circuit.
189. See § 105 (exempting employees engaged in collective bargaining through an
NLRB-certified labor union for liability under antitrust law).
190. See 93 CONG. REC. S6436, 6441-42 (daily ed. June 5, 1947) (statement of Sen.
Taft) (indicating the Congressional intent to use the law of agency to determine the
NLRB’s jurisdiction over employees).
191. See Todd D. Saveland, FedEx’s New “Employees”: Their Disgruntled
Independent Contractors, 36 TRANSP. L.J. 95, 110-11 (2009) (suggesting that the
onslaught of litigation undertaken by FedEx delivery drivers seeking representation
before the NLRB is evidence of the drivers’ dissatisfaction with the terms and
conditions of their employment).
192. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 497 n.3 (marking a shift toward
entrepreneurialism, away from the right to control the manner and means of work
performance).
193. See, e.g., NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that that the right-to-control test is the test to determine employee status for
purposes of the NLRA).
194. See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 8, at 7 (noting that FedEx marks a
departure from both Supreme Court precedent and circuit law).
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